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TO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 3253
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INFO RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI IMMEDIATE 8349

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 011146

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2019
TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [KNNP](#) [MNUC](#) [XB](#) [ZP](#) [ZO](#) [AE](#) [PK](#)
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH NON-NPT STATES

Classified By: ISN C.S. Eliot Kang for reasons 1.4 (b)(c)(d)

ACTION REQUEST

¶1. (U) Embassy Abu Dhabi is requested to deliver points in para 4 to appropriate host country government officials.

End action request.

SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND

¶2. (S) As reported by Post via email, on December 18, 2008 the Pakistani Embassy in Abu Dhabi called the U.S. Embassy and inquired about the U.S.-UAE 123 nuclear agreement. During the conversation, the Pakistani representative said that Pakistani President Ali Asif Zardari offered to assist the UAE with civil nuclear expertise during his November 2008 visit to Abu Dhabi. While we have no additional information to substantiate this offer, we wish to reconfirm with the UAE our understanding of its commitment to pursue nuclear energy in a completely transparent manner consistent with nonproliferation norms that would preclude cooperation with Pakistan in the development of its peaceful civil nuclear program. Pakistan is not a signatory of the NPT and has not concluded a full-scope safeguards agreement or an Additional Protocol with the IAEA. Its nonproliferation credentials have been damaged by the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network. For these reasons, we do not believe Pakistan would be an appropriate partner for cooperation.

End summary and background.

OBJECTIVES

¶3. (S) Post should achieve the following objectives:

- Welcome the UAE's commitment to pursuing the highest standards of nonproliferation, and in particular note the following statements from its policy White Paper: 1) to only consider partnerships with companies having a history of transparent operations and a reputation for excellence in safety, and whose national governments are parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and have negotiated and implemented safeguards agreements as required by the Treaty; and 2) to cooperate with the governments and firms of friendly and responsible nations that adhere to the highest standards of safety, security and nonproliferation.
- Ensure a common, explicit understanding that this precludes cooperation with Pakistan.

End objectives.

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS

Begin Suggested Talking Points

14. (S/REL UAE)

-- We look forward to bringing into force the U.S.-UAE Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation (123 Agreement) that was signed January 15. The Agreement will establish a firm foundation for mutually beneficial cooperation in civil nuclear energy.

-- This Agreement will serve as a model for other countries in the region, and beyond, on the responsible pursuit of civil nuclear energy by demonstrating the advantages of transparency, engagement, and cooperation.

-- The United States welcomes the UAE's commitment to pursuing the highest standards of nonproliferation, including foregoing uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing.

-- We also take particular note of the following points from your policy White Paper: 1) that the UAE would only consider partnerships with companies having a history of transparent operations and a reputation for excellence in safety, and whose national governments are parties to the Treaty on the

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Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and have negotiated and implemented safeguards agreements as required by the Treaty; and 2) that the UAE would cooperate with the governments and firms of friendly and responsible nations that adhere to the highest standards of safety, security and nonproliferation.

-- We understand that the Government of Pakistan may have offered you assistance with your civil nuclear program.

-- We note that Pakistan is not a signatory of the NPT and has not concluded a full-scope safeguards agreement or an Additional Protocol with the IAEA. Its nonproliferation credentials have been damaged by the AQ Khan nuclear proliferation network.

-- We presume therefore that your stated policies would preclude cooperation, including training, with non-NPT parties, including Pakistan, or with individuals or firms from non-NPT states.

-- This is an approach that we strongly urge all countries that are beginning development of nuclear power to take.

-- We would appreciate a specific confirmation that your policies preclude cooperation with non-NPT parties, including Pakistan. Such an explicit statement will have a significant, positive impact on the Congressional review process of our cooperation agreement.

-- We also hope that the UAE would proceed to implement its other nonproliferation commitments at an early date.

-- Your stated intention to conclude an Additional Protocol to your safeguards agreement, to adhere strictly to the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines, and to adopt the 2005 Amendment expanding and strengthening the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) are all indications of your strong commitment in this regard and early action on these would also have a positive impact on the Congressional review process.

-- We look forward to the completion of the governmental review processes in both our countries and the early entry into force of the Agreement.

REPORTING DEADLINE

15. (U) Please report response within ten working days of receipt of this cable. Please include SIPDIS in all responses.

POINT OF CONTACT

16. (U) Department point of contact for follow-up is Chris Herrington ISN/CPI 647-5035.
CLINTON